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This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Strategic Product Design at the International 
Hellenic University. The study investigates performance-based contracting in retail sector. 
Evidence in the context of supply in highly competitive market such as FMCG involving 
manufacturers and retailers indicates that the performance that companies buy and sell can be 
analyzed as specific combinations of effectiveness, efficiency and risk. Firms engage in a 
complex and time-consuming process to design and agree upon performance targets, payment 
mechanisms of buying and selling future performance. The conventional procedure of buying 
and selling products or services change to an environment of buying and sell performances that 
are necessary to gain competitive advantage. The research focuses on retail sector and the 
relationship between purchasing managers and suppliers. The research is not focused on the 
sub-contractors’ companies e.g. transport companies, logistics centres etc.) between supplier 
and the retail company. The study investigates performance-based contracting in long term-
supply relationships. Evidence in the context of supply relationships involving suppliers of 
consumer B2B companies. This study aims to provide a review and synthesis of the 
performance-based contracting (PBC) literature across academic disciplines. The theoretical 
framework used to provide a theoretical assumption for the analysis of empirical evidence. 
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Highly competitive markets as Fast Moving Consumer Goods try to find new approaches to 
engage performance and increase value in the supply chain. Retailers identify the need of new 
contract agreements with suppliers. Because of the characteristics of the products both sides 
agree also in other terms to increase flexibility to the supply chain. (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999).  
According to Mouzas Performance-based contracting is about buying and selling solutions. 
Long-term supply relationships between suppliers and retailers creates strategic relationship. 
The conventional procedure of buying and selling products or services change to an 
environment of buying and sell performances that are necessary to gain competitive advantage 
(Lariviere,2005). Many contracting mechanisms has been explored in theoretical level but not 
tested in real world. There are three well known contracting mechanisms in supply chain: the 
wholesale price contract, buyback contract and the revenue-sharing contract (Katok and Wu, 
2009). Contracting parties face the contractual process as an opportunity to renegotiate when 
external or internal factors occurs (Macaulay, 2004). Classical contractual agreements are not 
sustainable because they do not focus on the creation of maximum potential value 
Performance-based contracts set relational and absolute norms that included in contract 
agreements. They codify the both sides knowledge about a) efficiency b) effectiveness and c) 
economical ways to buy solutions to business needs (Mouzas, 2016). The purchasing 
departments in supply chains is at the forefront of the success in one organisation. Purchasing 
managers and suppliers create the value in organisations, to produce and distribute a specific 
product to the final customer. The study investigates performance-based contracting in long 
term-supply relationships. Evidence in the context of supply relationships involving suppliers 
of consumer B2B companies and FMCG retailers indicates that the performance that 
companies buy, and sell can be examined and analysed as specific combinations of 
effectiveness, efficiency and risk. The previous literature review based on buyer-supplier 
exchanges that services or service elements, implemented the model of (PBC) performance-
based. Also, based performance contracting have gained increasing popularity in services or 
services supply chains. This paper aims to fill this gap in contracting and agreements between 
purchasing departments and suppliers in highly competitive markets such as FMCG and to 
provide a model that will be useful for the organisations to create savings between purchasing 
department and suppliers.  
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The objectives of the study are to explain in detail supply chains and supply chains type of 
contracts, performance-based contracts, study of the FMCG and retail sector and to assess the 
benefits and challenges of the performance based contracting behaviour. Although there is a 
substantial amount of academic work on barriers to assuming future performance (Cachon & 
Lariviere, 2001, Williamson, 2008), there is a research gap about how firms attempt to 
overcome these barriers by developing a performance-based contracting. 
Methodology of the study based on secondary and primary research. The primary research 
conducted in purchasing department perspective. The research split to two basic areas first a 
detailed study of the relationship between the purchasing department and a strategic supplier 
of one product category then after the findings of the performance targets between strategic 
supplier and retailer try to find the incentives between other suppliers of the same product 
category. A questionnaire is used to identify key performance indicators with in depth 
interview process. After the first evaluation of the findings a feedback from assist the whole 
study to identify performance targets in retail sector. For example, the framework of contractual 
performance a) contractual effectiveness, b) contractual efficiency (Mouzas, 2016) and 
contractual risk was a result to identify the gaps in the literature and the theoretical ideas with 
the empirical study. The study provides also an empirical classification of the supplier from 
the angle of the retailer see the cooperation with the suppliers and the rating system.  
Purchasing managers and suppliers in retail sector should meditate performance-based 
principles when try to design or negotiating a performance-based contract. It is too difficult to 
replace the ‘traditional’ trade agreement with performance based contract because of the 
complexity and analysis of the shared data It is necessary to have a closer look at relevant 
contractual agreements to analyze the impact of that strategy in the industrial and 
manufacturing context. (Malhotra & Van Alstyne, 2014).  
The paper contributes to performance based contract literature by identifying performance 
factors influencing maximization of the value of supply chain between supplier and retailer.  
The company that will be analysed and create a case is a global discount supermarket chain 
that operates around 10,000 stores across Europe and USA. It is one of the top five retailers 
across the world with sales around 83 billion dollars 2015. The company specialised in private 
label products as a backbone of the business. The strategic supplier that will be analysed is one 
of the biggest suppliers in processed meat products in Greece. The turnover of the supplier is 
135 million 2017. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature, Section 
3 discusses the research methodology and how the data collected and evaluated, Section 4 
presents the empirical findings and present the process of contracting between retailer and 
supplier also, provide the short answers from the interview between purchasing department and 
strategic supplier and the method of supplier evaluation. Section 5 discusses the cross-case 
findings and develops the research propositions. Section 6 concludes by pointing out 
managerial implication as well as limitations and future research avenues.  
 
 
In this chapter will be analysed existing literature on supply chains, performance-based 
contracts and the theory that supply chain composed of independent handlers, who acting with 
their own business interests and achieve systemwide efficiency though the differences that 
faced in local and global optimization problem. The main objective is to set rules for materials 
or products accountability and pricing that will assist independent entities approaching the 
desirable outcome ( Lariviere, 1999). 
 
 
Supply chains are composed of independent units such as suppliers, distributors, retailers and 
customers. The units linked by financial, material, information and decisional flows. Every unit 
has individual preferences, that try to optimise his own preference. From global point of view 
supply chains have inefficiencies. Many companies around the world try to overcome these 
inefficiencies through long term contracts and cooperation’s that can improve the efficiency of 
supply chains and provide better competitive advantage (Fiala, 2004). 
 
Recently there are growing interest among practitioners and academics in the field of supply 
chain management and there are a lot of researches that represent supply chain contracts. Few 
products are so simple that one organisation can handle the entire process of the goods. Most 
supply chains coordinate the independent entities in a way such to maximise their own profit. 
The control of the decision lead companies most of times to decentralised operations. For 
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example, outsourcing of various elements of the production is common business model in many 
industries (Farlow et al., 1995, Iyer and Bergen, 1997). Global business environments often 
operate in multiple sites worldwide and reporting to different organizational function in the 
corporation. Operational control of these sites may be decentralized managed. 
  
 
 
Contracting in supply chain split into two theories the first takes a particular contract and 
determines the optimal actions are assuming that the contract terms are fixed. Also, there are 
some parameters to take in consideration in this theory such as costs or profits. The second 
theory take optimal policies under a contract as give and consider whether the terms of trade 
can be adjusted to at least improve or coordinate the supply chain. For example, there are a 
firm who propose specific terms through contractual form and ask the what contract it would 
be offered.  (Lariviere, 1999) 
 
The contracting mechanisms has been explored in theoretical level but not tested in real world. 
There are three well known contracting mechanisms in supply chain: the wholesale price 
contract, buyback contract and the revenue-sharing contract (Katok and Wu, 2009). Previous 
researches focused on contracting arrangement to eliminate inefficiencies through the supply 
chains. (Cachon, 2003). The coordination of the supply chain may differ from one organization 
to another. In simple business environment a contract must provide to the retailer the optimum 
order that will be the same amount when the initial or centralized setting was given. (Cachon, 
2003). The arrangement between the risk of the supplier and the retailer make the supplier’s 
profit depend on realized sales. According to Cachon and Lariviere risk-sharing, buy-back and 
revenue-sharing contract, provide different outcome for both sides (supplier and retailer). Risk-
sharing generates equivalent identical outcome for both sides. In buy-back contracts supplier 
must pay to the retailer a negotiated rebate for all unsold units, assuming the risk that associated 
with over-orders. Buyback contracts are common in pharmaceuticals, computer software and 
electronics companies (Padmanabhan and Png, 1995). In revenue-sharing contract, a retailer 
pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the gross revenue 
the retailer generates. Also, the supplier set a higher order to the retailer in return for a 
percentage in gross revenue of the retailer. For any buy-back contract there exists a revenue-
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sharing contract that generates the same cash flows for any realization of demand (Cachon and 
Lariviere, 2005) 
 
 
 
Previews studies in performance-based contacts provide the defining of the agreement between 
two negotiated parts in a supply chain. According to Mouzas performance-based contracting is 
buying and selling at the same time performance. Contracting parties sometimes see the 
contract and the contract terms as an opportunity to renegotiate when external or internal 
factors occurs from the economic environment even though the negotiated parties have defined 
properly all the possible obligations to perform (Macaulay, 2004). Additionally, performance 
based contracting deal with ‘outcomes’ or ‘outputs’ that is aligned with the business goals of 
the contracting parties. Also, emphasizes the risk of the supplier if not achieve the desirable 
performance and as a result there is a system of reward or punishment. Despite these 
characteristics in performance-based contracts described the payment mechanism and the 
achievement of key performance indicators (KPIs) that is tied and aligned to supplier incentives 
to buyer’s contractual agreement and sometimes is unable to transfer the risk to sub-suppliers 
(e.g. transport companies) (Kleemann and Essig 2013). 
 
Recently researches describe the performance outcomes of buying and selling can be assessed 
with specific terms: effectiveness, efficiency and risk (Mouzas, 2016). Contractual 
effectiveness deal with the theory that the end-customer completely cover the needs between 
the process of the counterparts. An effective performance-based contracting can create 
accounts that relevant constituencies find acceptable (Mouzas, 2016). In fast-moving consumer 
goods (FMCG) suppliers and retailers create accounts measuring ‘brand awareness’, ‘loyalty’, 
‘brand equity’, ‘price sensitivity’, and ‘promotion effect’ to measure final sales at the end 
(Srinivasan, Park and Chang, 2005). Manufacturers and retailers negotiate other terms that not 
restricted only to buying and selling products. For example, payment deadlines are highly 
effective in financing businesses growth by contracting with suppliers and using them as 
creditors, this is very common in FMCG big retailers such as (Walmart, Aldi, LIDL etc.)  
 
Contractual efficiency linked to performance outcome which connected with operational 
excellence or productivity. Contractual efficiency provides the solution to end-customers 
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(Roehrich & Caldwell, 2012). Contractual efficiency is more improvement of operational 
margins and cost minimization. For example, occurs tangible and intangible assets such as 
knowhow and it is not possible to reflect the real value of the resource (Mouzas and Ford, 
2012). This might relate to specific contractual outcomes or business opportunities.  
 
Contractual risk combined with the probability that an unwanted situation or event happened 
and has and adverse impact of the performance that have defined in the contract. Risk exposure 
is highly relevant in assessing future performance. This cost is like systematic risk and the 
opportunity cost of capital varies from contract to contract (Mouzas and Ford, 2011). 
 
 
 
Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) relates to modern retail, products that are sold quickly 
and at low cost, such as packaged foods, beverages, OTC drugs and other consumables that 
customers using every day. The profit margin for both manufacturers and retailers are relatively 
small but they generate large quantities and create cumulative profit that can be substantial. A 
retailer is a merchant or a business enterprise, whose main business is selling directly to final 
consumers. Activities that the retailers perform is buying, selling, marketing grading and risk 
trading. (McKinsey & Company, 2018).  
The major issue of the retail sector is the demand. Retailers cannot predict the demand 
accurately and that leads to inefficiencies through the supply chain. Significant losses or extra 
costs due to under-stocking or overstocking (Cai, W. et al., 2015). One of the practices attempt 
to solve this effect is to have both parties a minimum order commitment. The supplier set 
quotas for how many products will sell and the retailer agree to charge the supplier for unsold 
units. Because of the characteristics of the products both sides agree also in other terms to 
increase flexibility to the supply chain. (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999).  
 
 
The recognition of this situation has initiated study approaches for the supply chain 
coordination to eliminate the risks of both sides and reduce the inefficiencies. The review of 
other studies shows a numerous type of contract that create incentives for both sides. These 
contracts include  quantity-discount contracts (Kolayetal., 2004) buy-back contracts (Emmons 
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and Gilbert,1998; Pasternack,2008; Xiongetal.,2011), backup agreements (Eppen andIyer, 
1997), revenue-sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere,2005; Giannoccaro and 
Pontrandolfo,2004; Lietal.,2009;Pasternack, 2005), sales-rebate contracts (Taylor, 2002; 
Wongetal.,2009), and quantity flexible contracts (Lian and Deshmukh, 2009;  Tsay, 1999; Tsay 
and Lovejoy, 1999; Wang and Tsao,2006). The types of contracts that have mentioned only 
increase flexibility in the supply chain but not solve the problem of performance. Both sides 
must align their own incentive systems and prioritise objectives that reflect to the performance 
of the supply chain (Dwayne Whitten, Green and Zelbst, 2012). 
 
Performance-based contracts set relational and absolute norms that included in contract 
agreements. They codify the both sides knowledge about a) efficiency b) effectiveness and c) 
economical ways to buy solutions to business needs (Mouzas, 2016) and hence become 
“knowledge repositories” and reference points (Hart and Moore, 2008). Classical contractual 
agreements are not sustainable because they do not focus on the creation of maximum potential 
value. Sometimes also, fails to manage tensions such as cooperation versus competition, 
inflexibility versus flexibility or short-terms versus long terms orientation. For example, 
instability is very common in retailers of private label products in long term relationships with 
the suppliers that dominate the market with same quality products and half price from the 
traditional own product of the supplier. In performance-based contracting both parties create a 
framework of performance targets that they benefit from this process according to a set of 
actualized end-results. According to Mouzas this type of contracts reduces the costs of 
recurrent transaction b) provides a) reduces the costs of running recurrent transactions; b) 
provides certainty and calculability regarding the conditions under which performance may 
take place; and, c) reduces information asymmetry. Retailers pass the risks exposure to their 
suppliers; nonetheless, firms are not immune from external risks, even if the risks are 
diversified away. The recent crisis in financial institutions has demonstrated this 
(Mouzas & Ford, 2011) 
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According to the above aspects’ performance-based contracts theories that analysed focuses in 
more in services and providers in supply chain. There are not empirically review of contracting 
mechanism in retail only in theoretical level. Most existing studies focus on side of 
procurement where performance-based contracts used to target principal agent problems. 
Moreover, even though the initial research of retail contract mechanism and the flexibility that 
they provide between the relationship of the supplier and purchasing department of a retailer 
do not address the problem accurately to maximize efficiency or to reduce risk exposure for 
both sides. Together with the basic understanding of performance base contracts (emphasis on 
outcomes and incentives), the contracting process and the perspectives need to define for the 
retail overview aspect. The empirical study below address what key performance indicators 
should be used to create a performance-based contracts in retail also how it will be shared this 
performance targets between retailers and suppliers and how the end customer will benefit 
through the contracting process in term to increase the value in supply chain.   
 
 
 
 
The research focuses on retail sector and the relationship between purchasing managers and 
suppliers. The research is not focused on the sub-contractors’ companies e.g. transport 
companies, logistics centres etc.) between supplier and the retail company. The research 
examines how purchasing managers in retail sector and suppliers set performance targets that 
increase profit, flexibility, elimination of inefficiencies.  
 
 
 
Secondary research obtained and summarized from existing data collated to increase the overall 
effectiveness of research.  Secondary research includes research material published in valid 
resources such as ScienceDirect, Emerald insight and other educational institutions. Primary 
research conducted through semi-structured in-depth interviews. The use of interviews helps 
15 
 
 
to gather valid and reliable data that are relevant to research question(s) and objectives. 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). 
 
The research initiated between September and November 2018. In the first stage, only two 
counterparts analysed the purchasing department and supplier. The purchasing department of 
the company included 4 senior purchasing managers (team leaders), 4 purchasing managers 
responsible for various product categories in assortment and 4 assistants that manage every-
day issues with the suppliers. The analysis based in buying organisation and not focused in 
supplier. In the second stage of the research 10 more suppliers from the same product category 
analysed to see how they respond according to the performance targets that have discussed 
with the strategic supplier. Interviewees included Sales Directors, Key Account Managers, 
Category Managers, Purchasing Managers and Financial Managers. Each interview was face-
to-face interview and lasted about 30 min. The purpose of executing a second stage of data 
collection was to obtain copies of contracts. Finally, the research concludes with a simple case 
study for deeper going analysis (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008), using also theoretical tools 
and sampling (Pagell and Wu, 2009). 
 
 
 
The company that have analysed is a global discount supermarket chain that operates around 
10,000 stores across Europe. It is one of the top five retailers across the world with sales around 
83 billion dollars. The company specialised in private label products as a backbone of the 
business. The company has great control over manufacturing costs and set its own price.  
The strategy that the company follows is every day low price strategy with special promotions 
per week. That create more demand for products and sometimes lead the suppliers to over-
orders than the usual orders.  
 
 
 
The research initiated in September 2018, it was clear that there was a need to engage and 
capture data collection from exchanges and overcome the reluctance of the companies to reveal 
sensitive information about their contractual agreements. In the first stage was the engagement 
of the purchasing department of the retail company and one strategic supplier of one product 
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category. The purpose of this initial stage of engagement is to gain access to sensitive 
information about negotiation processes and key characteristics of relevant resources.  
In the second stage of the research, carried out between October and November 2018, expand 
the research to 10 suppliers of the same product category. The choose of the product category 
was very important for the retail firm, that means that also this category is strategically 
important for the firm in terms of value, loyalty, frequency, and profitability. The purpose of 
these final interviews is to understand if the other suppliers that are not strategic for the retail 
firm set the same performance target to increase profitability. Each interview at this final stage 
lasted about 30 minutes and sometimes extra questions made to understand if the suppliers 
understood the process of performance targeting. 
Obtaining contracts was a method to move beyond subjective views obtained through 
interviews and examine objectified manifestations between the retail firm and the suppliers. 
The second stage of data collection emphasized on obtaining procedures, archival records, 
reports prepared for key accounts. The implementation of data collection based on multiple 
sources of evidence was necessary in the way of explanation effort to understood how 
companies overcome problems or inefficiencies to performance-based contracts. It was 
essential the collection of primary data to make more detailed examination the previous and 
current contracts.  
 
 
This section provides the process from data collection to data analysis. Critical examination of 
data and evaluation of every aspect and recombination of every finding to identify the 
mechanism that used in this sector to provide information about performance-based contracts. 
The data represented visually using tables and figures and will presented in the next chapter. 
Cross-case analysis also performed to discern patterns that can be existed in the relate 
bibliography and contract mechanisms that already used.  
 
To identify performance targets in retail sector come out from the data. For example, the 
framework of contractual performance a) contractual effectiveness, b) contractual efficiency 
and contractual risk was a result to identify the gaps in the literature and the theoretical ideas 
with the empirical study. The simplicity of the sample to one simple buying procedure helped 
to understand in detail the importance of performance-based contracts in highly competitive 
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markets where the strategic advantages is important. The literature and the contractual 
behaviour that the companies use focuses on barriers to predict future performance and take 
under consideration behaviours or situation such as transaction costs, missing orders costs, 
moral hazard and trust between firms.  
 
The process of data analysis included quite systematically circles, moving theoretical concepts 
of performance results and empirical evidence of consent to the execution targets. This 
interaction between theoretical and empirical tools data differ from one-way inductive or 
deductive methods. For this reason, it was essential to engage analytical experimentation, with 
this method covered three major challenges complexity of the contracts, time and comparison. 
Performance-based contracts are often very long because of the combination between the 
variety of contract clauses on related performance targets, requirements, risks and liabilities. 
The retail firms set every year different targets because of the form of FMCG and the high 
competition. They change the performance and maybe it will be a limitation for the future. The 
morphology of the market also set new incentives for supplier and business.  The focus on one 
product category give the opportunity to have not so many changes because competition cannot 
differentiate from year to year. Focused also in strategic supplier and the purchasing 
department of the retailer analysed the agreed performance targets and specific contract clauses 
to generate reliable comparisons. Finally, a feedback of the proved work is extremely important 
to fine tuning our interpretation and testing the validity and trustworthiness of the findings.  
 
 
This paper investigates performance-based contracting in business relationship between 
retailer and supplier. In the next chapters analyzed properly all the information gathered from 
internal information of the company. Because of the information sensitivity the company did 
not permit to reveal the name or other data that could reveal the identity of the company. For 
this reason, will presented some information about the company background.  
 
It is in the top 5 retailers in the world with sales of $83 billion in 2015. Today the company has 
around 11,000 stores around the world including United States. The permanent assortment is 
around 1700 products. The company retail philosophy centres on simplicity and maximum 
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efficiency at every stage of the business, from supplier to customer, enabling the company to 
sell high quality products from a limited range of exclusive own brand and well-known labels 
at the lowest prices Stores sell a limited range of carefully selected product lines and can offer 
these high-quality products at low prices due to a pan European bulk purchasing policy; The 
company own several their key supply chains and so are able to control cost and efficiency 
throughout the chain. Offering this limited range gives the company immense buying power 
and allows to keep low prices whilst maintaining the quality of range; and a common 
misconception is that the company will have an adverse impact upon existing town centres but 
in fact a recent Competition Commission report confirms that the company provides a different 
retail offer in comparison to the main food retailers in Greece. The company market 
capitalization in 2017 was 1,3 billion euros.  
 
The department that will analyse in detail in this assignment is the purchasing department and 
the strategy that follows to achieve the company’s goals and how. The company achieve to 
eliminating any additional costs from a supplier. Another interesting point to analyse is how 
the inventory of the company works and how the purchasing department makes cost reduction 
through the company growth and how it is possible to minimise operational costs and make 
aware costumer interest.  
The purchasing department is the heart of the company and has four divisions. Two divisions 
dealing everyday with private label brands, one division with most common brands in Greece 
and the third division with the promotion activities such as planning and creation of the leaflet 
with the promotions and sale offs of the company. Because of the complexity of the divisions 
of the company it will be analysed only the company purchasing strategy and how the private 
label brands division working to reduce costs to the company.  
Every private label brand division split to assortments and to purchasing managers that manage 
product lines or product assortments. The 
product assortment contains several hundred 
different products and that means a 
management of around five to ten suppliers. 
Private label products are the backbone of the 
company and have the key role to the strategical 
decisions of the company. The main goals of the 
private label divisions are the diversity of the 
Purchasing 
Department 
Private label 
products 
division 1 
Assortment 1 Assotment 2
Private label 
products 
division 2 
Branded 
Products 
division
Promotion 
Activities 
division
Figure 1(Organization chart of purchasing department) 
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assortment, competitive buying prices, minimalization of operational costs through the 
company activities and product innovations or patents.  
 
 
The supplier is one of the biggest suppliers in processed meat products in Greece. The turnover 
of the supplier is 135 million 2017. The factory exists private facilities in 15.000 sqm and 
employed 300 people. Also, the company is a Greek group of companies of processed and other 
foods. As a group, it holds a leading position in cold cuts market, with a growing presence in 
the pizza market, ready-made meals, chicken, burgers, salad, vegetables and feta as well as 
growing international sales with exports to many countries. The beginning was in 1980 and 
today the products of the Group have conquered the Greek market and 25 countries worldwide. 
The international presence of the company around the world is  
1) 2 Factories in EU 
2) 2 Factory in Greece for processed meat 
Today, the Group produces over 500 high quality products and operates in five sectors. In 
processed meat products, frozen foods (frozen vegetables, hamburgers, pizzas, prepared meals 
and much more), Greek traditional salads, feta cheese, extra virgin olive oil. The Group has 
succeeded in creating products that have become popular around the world. This success is due 
to the high level of quality, our staff, our know-how and the excellent relationship that we have 
with the people who trust our products over the years. 
 
In this section will analyse shortly the product 
category that we have focused. The total market 
value of processed meat category according to 
IRI is 241 million euros. The market divided in 
two sectors self-service products and counter. 
The total value of processed meat (self-service) 
products is approximately 97 million euros.  
Figure 2: (ICAP, 2017) 
40%
60%
Value Share 
Self Service Counter
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The price and promotion war in 2016 – 2017 of the retailers driven the market in growth 
(+1.9%). But with big losses in profits. (ICAP 2017)The turnover of the category in the retail 
company is 37 million euros only in self-service products. This turnover place the retailer in 
leading position with 40% market share in self-service products.  Also, the category for the 
company has 3% participation in general turnover of the company and is very important in 
terms of frequency, impulse consumer buying behaviour and spending per trip.  
 
 
Domestic consumption of cold cuts 
followed an upwards trend period 2000-
2009 with an average annual rate of 
change of 3.4%. Subsequently but the 
course of the market was generally 
declining because of its economic crisis 
that has affected the available consumer 
income. Especially about sales of 
processed meat through supermarkets 
(covering a high share in the overall 
market), various measurements show significant decline in sales volume last, event intensified 
by the problems that led to the cessation of business the largest supermarket chain, which was 
"deprived" of importance sales volume. This decline also affected private products label, 
despite their lower price than brand names.  
From the analysis of the consolidated balance sheet on a sample of 17 industries in the industry, 
with available balance sheets 2014-2015, the following results: Turnover and gross profits of 
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companies increased by 4.1% and 5.4% respectively in 2015. The operating result remained 
negative over the last two years. As a result, the final net result of the sample companies 
remained loss-making in 2015, however losses declined by almost 51%. EBITDA earnings 
increased by approximately 55%. (ICAP 2017). 
 
Meetings for the supplier and purchasing department is periodical and divided in three quarters. 
These three periods have different meaning from the two contracting parties. The first period 
is the planning period. In this period supplier review together with the purchasing department 
check business reviews that assist to the next period. The second period is the planning period 
the planning period take place for three months before. This process assists the retailer to make 
a future of activities such as promotion activities, setting of price point of the products and the 
self-strategy to increase impulse buying and spend per trips from customer. In this period also 
agreed the new products that will be launched for the next year. The third period is the annual 
trade negotiations that take place between January and March. This process allows to enhance 
certainty and calculability of contractual performance and reduces the potential of opportunistic 
behaviour through the negotiation period.  the manufacturers' key account managers contact 
retailers' purchasing managers to review the annual performance of their business relationship. 
 
The two sides recognize also the importance of their long-term supply relationship and try to 
identify novelties and innovations to combine insufficient resources to create joint gains. In 
practice the contracting process driven by: 1) Specific interests (e.g. property right for private 
labels or brands position, exclusivity issues or trade allowance of products in other chains to 
reduce potential risks. 2) the actual performance of replicated transactions as monitored 
through management information systems such as Electronic Data Interchange or Vendor 
Managed Inventory. Moreover, fair sharing data from companies such as IRI, Nielsen and GfK 
from both sides. 3) internal business review to purpose retailer’s specific performance targets 
regarding planograms, shelf space, promotion activities and new product launches. Another 
factor is the considerable risk and the costs of handling, administrative, promotional costs 
combined with working capital. The retailer demand from the supplier ‘trade allowances’ 
which set a fee or payment blocks as compensation for bearing risks in the supply chain. 
Retailer set high trade allowances in the following situations:  
1) New products development  
2) Plan for intensive promotions  
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3) Performance targets when the sharing of private label in product portfolio is high  
Sometimes strategic supplier rejects the performance in private label product portfolio. In this 
study the supplier agrees to these performance targets and participate in private label product 
portfolio and generate incremental sales that assist the monetary flow of the supplier activities. 
 
 
Supplier evaluation process is very important for the strategic sourcing of the company. The 
main target of the evaluation process is the minimization of purchasing risk and the 
maximization of the overall value to the purchaser (Monczka & Handfield & Giunipero & 
Pattersson 2011, 240). A formal qualification process is used when selecting a supplier for 
cost-one-time contract that is established in long term partnership (Sollish & Semanik 2011, 
101). A supplier process begins when there is a need for new supplier most of the time supplier. 
 
The supplier evaluation and selection process according to Monczka et al. (2011, 241) consists 
of seven steps:  
 
a) recognition the need for supplier selection,  
b) identification of key sourcing requirements,  
c) determine a sourcing strategy,  
d) identifying potential supply sources,  
e) limit the suppliers in a selection pool,  
f) determine a method of supplier evaluation and selection,  
g) select the supplier and reaching an agreement. Monczka et al. (2011, 250) 
 
The supplier evaluation is simple to scale according the needs and the requirements of each 
product category  
 
The retailer uses also the following criteria to evaluate a supplier:  
1) The turnover that the supplier generates with the retail and how big is this percentage 
in total turnover of the supplier 
2)  The intensity of the cooperation through product innovation, product portfolio  
3) The probability to change the supplier 
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The retailer evaluates these criteria with the following rating system the following figure 
explain the process of evaluation with example 
 
Figure 5 (Strategic Supplier Evaluation Example) 
In this case the retailer contribution in turnover is 40% in supplier total turnover. That makes 
negotiation power of the retailer very strong and the supplier need to find alternate ways to be 
more flexible and efficient. The product portfolio contribution of the supplier to the retailer 
assortment is 68% in private labels together with branded products 75% that makes supplier 
very important to the retailer. In case of replacement of the supplier the retailer needs two years 
to change this cooperation with another supplier.  
 
Figure 6(Base Supplier Evaluation Example) 
In this case the supplier has small contribution in product portfolio of the company also there 
is small dependence between the supplier and the supplier. The supplier product turnover 
comes from other cooperation and may be this cooperation is more opportunistic. 
Turnover
•The supplier turnover is 35 million euros. The retailer contribution to the supplier turnover is 14 
million 
•Rating: 4 in 5
Cooperation
•From the product portfolio of 80 product the supplier produce 55 private label products and 5 
brand product
•Rating: 4 in 5 
Probability 
of change
•The retailer need 2 years to change the supplier 
•Rating: 5 in 5 
Turnover
•The supplier turnover is 35 million euros. The retailer contribution to the supplier turnover is 2.1 
million euros
•Rating: 2 in 5
Cooperation
•From the product portfolio of 80 product the supplier produce 10 private label products and 5 brand 
product
•Rating: 2 in 5 
Probability of 
change
•The retailer can replace the supplier in next negotiating period  
•Rating: 1 in 5 
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Figure 7(Partner Evaluation Example) 
In this case the supplier is a partner for the retailer and the retailer for the supplier. 85% of the 
total turnover of the supplier comes from the cooperation with the retailer. The retailer share 
knowhow, information and innovation with the supplier. In this case sometimes retailers 
acquire the factories from the suppliers. This is also popular in business like Unilever, P&G 
etc. that have large product portfolios in different product categories. Also, the probability of 
change is too difficult. 
 
Figure 8(Synergy Supplier Evaluation Example) 
In this case the supplier is important in terms of cooperation and the number of products that 
have in product portfolio but the product categories such as commodities is not assist the 
supplier to make a partnership with the retailer. The retailer can replace the supplier in the next 
negotiation round. Only one issue is that the supplier supplies other countries that the retailer 
operates and increase the risk that a new supplier cannot supply other countries through the 
complexity of the environment when a supplier export goods in other countries. That risk is 
not so easy to handle from the side of the retailer.  
 
Turnover
•The supplier turnover is 35 million euros. The retailer contribution to the supplier turnover is 30 million euros
•Rating: 5 in 5
Cooperation
•Exclucivity of products and also a full product category portfolio in terms of better pricing and minimazation of costs. 
The retailer contribute also in knowhow of the supplier
•Rating: 5 in 5 
Probability of 
change
•Too difficult to replace the supplier also the supplier cannot cooperate with other firms 
•Rating: 5 in 5 
Turnover
•The supplier turnover is 35 million euros. The retailer contribution to the supplier turnover is 8 million euros
•Rating: 2 in 5
Cooperation
•The supplier supplies basic products such as commodities (flour, sugar, pasta etc). No need of exclucivities or any of 
innovation products. But the supplier also supplies other countries acrros europe that the retailer handle.
•Rating: 5 in 5 
Probability of 
change
•The retailer can replace the supplier in next negotiating period. 
•Rating: 1 in 5 
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The classification of the suppliers is very important for the retail company according to these 
4 evaluations of the suppliers the company classify the suppliers in 4 categories. 
Strategic supplier: is the supplier that company generate 
volumes and turnover for the company the importance of the 
cooperation is important, and the replacement of the supplier 
is difficult and takes years  
Partner supplier: is a tailored business relationship based 
on trust, openness, and shared risk and reward that yields a 
competitive advantage. Partners participate in new product 
development process. Partnerships are flexible 
relationships that depend on honesty and integrity to 
succeed.  
 
Synergy supplier: is the supplier that the cooperate with the retailer in low price products such 
commodities, create value through big volumes and the retailer can easily replace the supplier 
in annual contracting process but there is a side effect when a purchasing manager choose a 
supplier of this class gives quantities and create a synergy with other countries to have better 
prices.  
Base supplier: is the supplier for routine products, promotion activities and small project that 
can assist the retailer to increase volumes through the introduction of new SKU’s the 
relationship between supplier and the purchasing manager of the company is more 
opportunistic. The model that the retailer uses based on Kraljic model with modifications from 
the angle that the retailer classifies the suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Partner
Base 
Suppliers
Synergy 
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Risk 
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Figure 9 (Retailer supplier 
classification) 
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In this section will be analysed the responses from the interview between the purchasing 
department and the strategic supplier.  
 
1) What are the responsibilities that you have in terms of contract agreement? 
 
Purchasing Manager: “The contract agreement that we have with the supplier is an 
agreement after the negotiations. The responsibilities of the purchasing department are 
net-net price guarantee for an annual time frame, payment deadline, delivery terms 
according to Incoterms in our contracts we have carriage-free delivered duty paid, 
agreed minimum best before date (BBD), product quality specification, pallet 
specification, penalties in term of no deliveries and divergence of the quality 
specification, property rights of the product and fees for management and handling 
costs” 
Senior Purchasing Manager: “The contract agreement with the supplier is the most 
important issue for our department. Terms like price, deliveries, product specification 
and delivery described in the contract agreement. The responsibility of the contract 
agreement is by the side of the purchasing department. Any contract violation affects 
directly the supplier.” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “The contract agreement with the retailer is very important 
from our side. The retailer create the contract and we agree to this contract. Our 
responsibility is to carry out every contract term of the retailer. Some of the terms are 
negotiated with the purchasing manager other terms is fixed and there is no chance to 
change” 
 
2) Could you describe the issues that occur with the traditional trade agreement? 
 
Purchasing Manager: “The trade agreements that our purchasing department create, 
and design are fixed. Net-net price guarantee for any quantity (high price guarantee). 
There are agreements that the first set is the quantity and it is fixed and then the net-
net price. The issues that occur with the agreements are sometimes the high demand or 
the low demand of a product can affect directly the supplier. Another issue is when the 
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prices of raw materials change affect directly the supplier and sometimes the 
performance of our agreement. For example, we deal a price for one product in 1 euro 
and at the middle of the year the prices of the raw materials go -20%. Most of the time 
we do not change the initial agreement and that is the issue also when prices from raw 
materials increase affect the supplier, as a result we cannot stabilized the final quality 
of the product because the supplier tries to find ways to reduce the expenses.  
Senior Purchasing Manager: “The issues that occur with the traditional agreements 
are when something from the external environment affect directly the prices. Sometimes 
it is difficult sometimes to monitoring other things such as standard quality and 
deliveries issues that happened because of the speed of the procedures” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “The issues of the agreement that we have with the supplier 
are most of the time with the daily business things. Of course, we make a prediction for 
the raw materials but sometimes something may change radically. Other problems are 
the monitoring of the daily issues, because of the complexity of the business the retailer 
cannot predict efficient the demand of the products and sometimes running out of stock 
or want extra deliveries that costs are not included in the agreement.” 
 
 
3) Why do you think that the performance-based contract will be more efficient? 
 
 Purchasing Manager: “The idea of the performance-based contracts is to make 
contracts more efficient, by optimizing incentives and allocating risks. Properly 
designed, a performance–based contract can achieve better results. The advantage 
comes from a better alignment of incentives with output objectives and encourage 
efficiency. The whole idea is to have a real win-win contract with the supplier”  
Senior Purchasing Manager: “If a contract is well designed then the efficient is 
definitely assured. The theory of the performance-based contract will be implemented 
when the right KPI’s will defined and monitored. Then the contract agreement will be 
more efficient” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “It is obligated to change because the FMCG sector 
changes year by year. The type of this contract will help industries to create better 
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relationships with the purchasing department. Definitely it will be an innovation but 
there is a need to define every aspect in the right way” 
 
4) What performance targets do you think is it possible to set in this agreement? 
 
 Purchasing Manager: “For sure monetary, supply and information targets. It is 
essential to have the right information at the right time because affect directly the 
performance” 
Senior Purchasing Manager: “It is better first to deal with KPI’s and then with the 
targets. The targets may be supply, information and financial targets” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “First financial targets, then delivery targets and of course 
information targets” 
 
5) What key performance indicators is ideal for such a contract? 
 
 Purchasing Manager: “Net-net price, payment deadlines, profitability, discount 
buying pricing in promotions, right distribution, stock replenishment, number of 
deliveries, shopper insights, customer complains.” 
Senior Purchasing Manager: “Pricing, profitability, dynamic system of payment, 
shipments per week, monitoring” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “Price, profitability, demand management, distribution of 
products, flexible payments, data insights” 
 
6) How do you imagine the punishment and award system? 
 
Purchasing Manager: “It is difficult to create punishment and award system but if the 
specifications are setted at the beginning of the cooperation there is no worries. If 
inefficiencies minimized and the risk exposure reduced both sides will be benefited. I 
think that the award and punishment system will be provided in contract clauses 
better”.  
Senior Purchasing Manager: “The system will be provided on contract clauses better 
I think that the traditional agreement has this type of clauses if there is any violation 
the supplier penalized” 
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Sales Director (Supplier): “It is obligated to identify all the aspects first and then we 
create penalties or awards for both sides” 
 
7) What is the optimal time for renewal the agreement of these type of contract? 
 
Purchasing Manager: “Depends on product category for commodities annually, for 
near foods or low-price products every two years” 
Senior Purchasing Manager: “Better annually to set new performance specifications 
after the evaluation of the process” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “It will be a risk if the contract not evaluated, I suggest 
annually after evaluation” 
 
 
8) Is there any external factor that affect performance? 
 
Purchasing Manager: “Competitors, macroeconomic environment, end-customer” 
Senior Purchasing Manager: “Competition, and the macroeconomic environment” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “Retailers, other manufactures, resources and 
macroeconomic environment” 
 
9) Is it possible the KPI’s that you have mentioned formulated in the contract? 
 
Purchasing Manager: “When the contract will be designed the contract clauses must 
have all the information needed to assist both sides” 
Senior Purchasing Manager: “I think that is not difficult to formulate this KPI’s in 
final contract the only thing is to monitor all the KPI’s that we have set” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “The purchasing department of the retailer will design the 
contract. 
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10) How do you imagine the collaboration between the two counterparts? 
 
Purchasing Manager: “I think that the collaboration will not change dramatically but 
some issues will be solved automatically. I think more solutions will have with this type 
of contract.” 
Senior Purchasing Manager: “The collaboration will be closed but probably more 
solutions in daily issues that occur in terms of transactions pricing etc. will solved” 
Sales Director (Supplier): “The collaboration will not change but from the supplier 
side I think will be more benefits and will increase the relationship between supplier 
and purchasing department.” 
 
 
The purchasing manager and the strategic supplier agreed to set performance targets that adds 
value to supply chain and the relationship between both sides. There was a categorization 
between these targets in 3 major categories a) Financial Targets b) Supply Targets c) 
Informational Targets. After consideration with the strategic supplier 10 more supplier from 
the same product category requested to check if the KPI’s could increase efficiency in compare 
with the contract that the retailer provide. In the following table will compare the results with 
the strategic supplier  
Table 1(Performance targets and suppliers) 
Performance 
Targets / KPI's Measure SS1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
Financial                        
Net-Net Price value/unit ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Discount Net-Net 
Price 
value/unit/per 
time of use ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Payment 
Deadline days ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Profitability % 
value/per net 
selling price ✓ ✕ ✓ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ 
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Management fees 
% 
value/turn over 
per year ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Supply                        
Number of 
deliveries per 
week Numeric ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Warehouse 
cost% 
Missing 
pallets/Per m2 ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Stock 
replenishment EUR-Pallet ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Transport fees % per delivery ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✕ 
Product damages 
% 
selling 
value/unit ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Informational 
Targets                       
EDI system  Units (SKU) ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Customer 
complain system savings/time ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ 
Payment deadline 
discount  
invoice 
value/per days ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Shopper Data value ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
 
In the relationship between suppliers and the retailer, the supplier was concerned with the 
performance targets that the purchasing department and the strategic supplier have set. They 
discussed a lot with performance targets related to financial measurements such as pricing 
payment from the other two categories concerned about performance targets such as 
operational capacities, number of shipments and stock replenishment. The supplier that focused 
in performance targets such as the supply focus on distribution level and the demand that need 
to cover only by branded products. From the other side the retailer focused in performance 
indicators such as cost saving and minimization of out of stock risks. The retailer provides a 
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solution in payment deadlines like a discounting system. For example, the supplier has an 
invoice of 10,000 euros and will be paid in 90 days. The supplier can use this system to 
withdraw the money of the transaction earlier and the supplier paid a small fee to the retailer 
3-4%. There is scale between days that connected with calculations and financial perspectives 
of the retailer.  
 
The contract agreement clause states that the written terms of the two counterparts represent 
the whole agreement and any oral agreement have been consolidated into the written document. 
(Translegal). Financial, supply and informational performance targets established by creating 
performance-based contract clauses. This analytical framework of binding rules and principles 
assist to enhance certainty of contractual performance. These principles emphasize in the 
importance of the informational aspects and the required terms of the contract. The following 
contract clauses focuses only in strategical cooperation and eliminate opportunistic cooperation 
with other suppliers. The strategic supplier or the partner will have more benefits than a supplier 
that uses the traditional contract agreement of the retailer.  
Table 2(Contract Clauses) 
Performance 
Targets / KPI's Measure Contract Clauses  
Financial      
Net-Net Price value/unit Volume and prices will be agreed annually 
Discount Net-Net 
Price 
value/unit/per 
time of use 
The plan of promotion activities will be setted from 
the retailer  
Payment Deadline days 90 days of payment/ Delivery costs 50-50 
Profitability % 
value/per net 
selling price 
Retailer margin 50% > supplier saving 10% 
Retailer margin 40% > supplier saving 5% 
Retailer margin 30% > supplier saving 2,5% 
Retailer margin 20% > supplier saving 0%.  
Management fees 
% 
value/turn over 
per year 
Turnover of supplier 1,000,000 euro - supplier fee 
0,25%  
Turnover of supplier 5,000,000 - supplier fee 0,20% 
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Turnover of supplier 10,000,000 - supplier fee 0,15% 
Turnover of supplier up to 20,000,000 - supplier fee 
0,10% 
Supply      
Number of 
deliveries per 
week Numeric 
Depends on the BBD of the product/ Fresh products 
daily 
Warehouse cost% 
Missing 
pallets/Per m2 
Fee cost 5 euro/per m2 that warehouse count to place 
the EUR-Pall 
Stock 
replenishment EUR-Pallet No extra fees for stock replenishment 
Transport fees % per delivery 5% per extra delivery that the supplier makes 
Product damages 
% 
selling 
value/unit 
Selling value charge/per unit -no returns to the 
supplier 
Informational 
Targets     
EDI system  Units (SKU) 
1% Saving for the supplier for minimization of 
invoices income 
Customer 
complain system savings/time 
CCS system will be installed to QA department of the 
supplier and retailer. Supplier will handle the 
incidents in term reduction of consumer fee. 
Payment deadline 
discount  
invoice value/per 
days 
Creation of scale system that the supplier can be paid 
earlier than the payment day. The supplier will pay a 
fee to the retailer 
Shopper Data value 
Continuous monitoring by a 3rd parties (IRI GfK, 
ACNielsen). Costs 50-50. 
 
The retailer and the supplier agreed of the terms that have mentioned previous with the 
performance indicators that have set through the discussion. Both counterparts believe that the 
contractual behavior will be more efficient.  
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Table 3 (Case Analysis versus previous contract clauses) 
Performance 
Targets / KPI's Measure Contract Clauses  Previous Contract Clauses 
Financial        
Net-Net Price value/unit 
Volume and prices will be agreed 
annually 
Volume and prices will be agreed 
annually 
Discount Net-
Net Price 
value/unit/per 
time of use 
The plan of promotion activities will 
be setted from the retailer  
The plan of promotion activities will 
be setted from the retailer  
Payment 
Deadline days 
90 days of payment/ Delivery costs 
50-50 
90 days payments/Delivery costs to 
the supplier  
Profitability % 
value/per net 
selling price 
Retailer margin 50% > supplier 
saving 10% 
Retailer margin 40% > supplier 
saving 5% 
Retailer margin 30% > supplier 
saving 2,5% 
Retailer margin 20% > supplier 
saving 0%.  
-- 
Management 
fees % 
value/turn over 
per year 
Turnover of supplier 1,000,000 euro - 
supplier fee 0,25% in total turnover 
Turnover of supplier 5,000,000 - 
supplier fee 0,20% in total turnover 
Turnover of supplier 10,000,000 - 
supplier fee 0,15% in total turnover 
Turnover of supplier up to 
20,000,000 - supplier fee 0,10% in 
total turnover 
0.30% in total turnover of the supplier 
Supply        
Number of 
deliveries per 
week Numeric 
Depends on the BBD of the product/ 
Fresh products daily 4 times a week  
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From the analysis of the previous situation the performance agreement is more efficient in point 
by point analysis. The case helps to understand better the current situation and the findings 
from the research to the retail company and the strategic supplier made in terms of contractual 
effectiveness, contractual efficiency and contractual risk (Kotler et al., 2002; Mouzas, 2006). 
 
 
Warehouse 
cost% 
Missing 
pallets/Per m2 
Fee cost 5 euro/per m2 that 
warehouse count to place the EUR-
Pall 
no cost for missing pallets/ Fix 
Penalty fee to the supplier  
Stock 
replenishment EUR-Pallet No extra fees for stock replenishment No extra fees for stock replenishment 
Transport fees % per delivery 
5% per extra delivery that the 
supplier makes No charge for extra deliveries 
Product damages 
% 
selling 
value/unit 
Selling value charge/per unit -no 
returns to the supplier Returns of damaged products 
Informational 
Targets       
EDI system  Units (SKU) 
1% Saving for the supplier for 
minimization of invoices income 
Installation and implementation from 
the retailer 
Customer 
complain system savings/time 
CCS system will be installed to QA 
department of the supplier and 
retailer  
Customer complains managed by e-
mail from retailer 
Payment 
deadline discount  
invoice 
value/per days 
Creation of scale system that the 
supplier can be paid earlier than the 
payment day. The supplier will pay a 
fee to the retailer No payment discount system  
Shopper Data value 
Continuous monitoring by a 3rd 
parties (IRI GfK, 
ACNielsen) Fair sharing data from 3rd parties 
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The theoretical framework used to provide a theoretical assumption for the analysis of 
empirical evidence. According to Mouzas the contractual performance specified as a 
combination for contractual effectiveness, contractual efficiency and contractual risks. The 
framework assists to deeper analysis and make a first approach how strategic cooperation in 
retail sector could anticipate future performance. The literature review addresses the theoretical 
parts of what means performance in supply chain and allow to connect all the parts of the 
contractual behavior between two counterparts the supplier and the retailer in based 
performance contracting behavior. Holistic research on existent retail contracts such as), 
revenue-sharing contracts (Cachon andLariviere,2005; Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo,2004; 
Lietal.,2009; Pasternack, 2005), sales-rebate contracts (Taylor, 2002; Wongetal.,2009), and 
quantity flexible contracts (Lian and Deshmukh, 2009; Tsay, 1999; Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999; 
Wang and Tsao,2006). The types of these contract address specific situations and they cannot 
provide a solution to both counterparts. The empirical evidence shows that there are many 
barriers between the relationship of the supplier and the retailer and because of the changing 
environment of FMCG sector both sides agree in terms to increase flexibility to the supply 
chain (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) and not performance. Contracting parties were able to be 
cooperating with the contract clauses and demonstrate specific combination of effectiveness 
efficiency and risk. Counterparts avoided performance targets that related to final prices and 
volumes and agreed on daily business performance problems. Also, they agree to cut cost from 
3rd parties such as IRI, GfK and AC Nielsen to provide data of the category and shopper 
insights. Agreed also in payments of 60 days and use of the new endeavour of payment system 
that can be paid in fewer days than the contract in return of a small fee to the supplier. 
Continuous stock replenishment was an imperative from retailer side to generate saving that 
enhance the operating margins and assist the contractual efficiency.  
 
The study presents the firm supply relationships with strategic suppliers and overcome the 
barriers of traditional retail agreement to anticipate future performance and create and design 
from scratch a theoretical framework of performance-based contracting. The counterparts are 
able to negotiate and agree upon performance targets with specific contract clauses and 
incentives to achieve specific agreed performance targets. Performance-based contracting 
enable suppliers and retailers to implement a value-based performance based on specific key 
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performance indicators. Also enable the two sides to realized performance levels such as 
incremental revenues, cost saving and avoidance of contractual risk. Two parties codify the 
knowledge that have in daily business and as result have a) efficient b) effective and c) 
reasonable solutions between the contracting parties. The sharing knowledge have mentioned 
in previous researches (Hart & Moore, 2008). These studies do not predetermine decisions in 
contract behavior but provide a useful framework (Weber & Mayer, 2011). The frequent 
instabilities of those strategic business partnership and contractual arrangement fail to manage 
terms such as “cooperation versus competition” (Mouzas, 2016). The findings suggest a 
process to the contracting design if the retailer want to achieve better performance in one 
product category should find the way for optimum performance for all supplier categories. The 
empirical evidence theory suggests that current contractual arrangement is not sustainable and 
do not create the maximum potential value from the procedures  
Supplier and retailer must create a framework of performance targets and should set objectives 
that approach the business targets and the final outcomes. Performance based contracting a) 
reduces the costs of recurrent transaction b) provide calculability and certainty c) reduces 
asymmetries in information flows (Mouzas, 2016). Finally, the findings of this research are a 
first approach in retail and FMCG and tries to fill the gap in performance based contracts in 
retail sector.  
 
Purchasing managers in retail sector should meditate the following principles when try to 
design or negotiating a performance-based contract.  
 
1) Share the knowledge with the supplier or align the objectives and incentives 
through contractive process. 
a) Define performance target  
b) Monitor performance  
The process of performance-based contracts in retail is new endeavor, it is work-in-
progress   
2) Formulate the performance targets to specific contract clauses  
Purchasing managers need to be aware that the contract clauses need to be 
complemented by legally enforceable contracts. The performance targets should be 
analytical in the design of the contract clauses. Shared principles energize counterparts 
38 
 
 
to achieve the agreed performance for example the elimination of the missing pallets in 
warehouse and the extra ordering fee makes also the supplier and the retailer to make 
better predictions for the demand. 
3) The purchasing department and suppliers need balanced performance-based 
contracts 
The biggest challenge to this contractual behavior is to achieve balance. Sometimes the 
negotiating power comes from the supplier side, especially in Greece in Europe the 
retailers have stronger negotiating power. If the contract is not designed properly then 
the risk of termination of the cooperation is possible. To achieve balance should carry 
a) effectiveness b) efficiency and prudent ways of contracting (Mouzas, 2016) 
4) The replacement process of the past contracting and the future performance-
based contracts 
Another challenge because of the morphology of the FMCG sector, sometimes because 
of the speed of the transaction there are trade agreements that the two counterparts do 
not have contracts. It is challenging to change the contracting process through 
businesses. 
 
The study outcome is a research of the based performance contracts in retail sector and how it 
could be achieved this theory combined with the empirical findings Although, the study 
study offers some initial insights into the interaction between retailer and supplier and the 
incentive of contracting process, further research is needed to develop to understand better the 
interaction between the two counterparts. The lack of time for research limit the findings 
between different typology of supplier and supply chain performance. Also, the limited access 
to the purchasing department of the retailer limit the findings from the purchasing perspective. 
The findings are more general and based on a case scenario between the contractual process. 
Survey research across industries could help understand and refine the theoretical and the case 
scenario. Further, research in different types of supplier should be investigated to find more 
performance targets that will be aligned in relation with performance-based contracts.   
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